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I.

INTRODUCTION

The public mind [in 1850s New Orleans] is bewildered by the
contradictory opinions given by the Engineers in the state as to
what ought and ought not to be done. One says cut-offs is the
only means of protecting the country. Another says cut-offs will
ruin the country, [so] make levees only. . . . A third says make
outlets. Each one quotes opinions of foreign engineers and
partial facts and pretended facts respecting the Mississippi [River]
1
to support his views. No wonder the legislature does nothing.

Last year, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Daubert v.
2
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Seton Hall University School of Law
held a symposium entitled, “Expert Admissibility: Keeping Gates,
Goals and Promises” [hereinafter “Seton Hall Symposium”].
Thereafter, the Seton Hall Law Review published the symposium’s
proceedings in two issues, wherein numerous leading evidence
scholars, as well as practitioners and a judge, offered assessments of
3
current courtroom expertise jurisprudence. Given the flurry of
scholarship that arose immediately following Daubert and the other
two important opinions that, along with Daubert, comprise the Daubert
4
5
trilogy (General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael )
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(the “trilogy”), one might have expected the Seton Hall Symposium
to be a celebration of clarity and progress. This expectation,
however, went unmet. Instead, Daubert has spawned a series of
intense debates and controversies concerning each of the trilogy
opinions—debates over the types of evidence that are, should be, or
should not be, admissible in court; the role of judges and juries
regarding expertise; and proposed reforms.
For example, one symposium participant argued that “Daubert is
the right [admissibility] standard because . . . [t]he central issue is
scientific ‘validity,’ and the criteria suggested by Daubert are useful in
6
resolving that issue.” That argument was met with the view that the
court’s “fundamental error” in adopting “science” as a legal category
immediately gave rise to uncertainty as to whether Daubert “had made
it more or less difficult for expert testimony to gain admission, a
harbinger of the confusion that now surrounds the whole subject of
7
admissibility of expert testimony.” Likewise, the abuse-of-discretion
standard for appellate review of admissibility decisions, confirmed in
Joiner, was attacked both by critics who support a change to allow
“reviewing courts to appraise claims of error in applying Daubert on a
8
9
de novo basis” (as nine states have done), and by critics who argue
that plenary review of a federal trial court’s evidentiary ruling to
exclude experts is already required on appeals from summary
10
judgments or directed verdicts. Kumho Tire, the third case in the
trilogy, was on the one hand praised for “making clear the . . .
gatekeeping obligation in regard to non-science” and the “proper
11
approach . . . even in regard to . . . science.” On the other hand,
6

Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts
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7
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34 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 81 (2003).
8
See Mueller, supra note 6, at 1023 (recommending new approach).
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Kumho Tire was also characterized as a “mismatch between tool and
task” (instructing “lower courts to apply standards that simply do not
12
apply”) and as an “embarrassing episode” in the history of evidence
13
law, because it is too restrictive (i.e., “relevance is not enough”
14
under Kumho Tire). Moreover, because Kumho Tire’s case-specific
evaluation “conflicts with widely-accepted methods of gauging
validity, and guarantees that we cannot develop consistent or useful
15
precedent,” some have viewed it as a departure from “bedrock
scientific principles.” More specifically, the reliability standards
developed in the Daubert trilogy were, under various formulations, too
16
17
high in civil cases, too low for prosecutors and many forensic
18
19
scientists, and too high for criminal defendants. Furthermore, at
least in practice, the reliability standards were too low for police
20
“experts” and too high for social scientists. Finally, some justified
Daubert gatekeeping on the basis that jurors struggle with complex
21
cases and statistical evidence, or that a decision “to admit expert
22
testimony will seem to the jury to be some kind of endorsement.”
Still others pointed out that “statements that jurors render inaccurate
23
verdicts are not supported by much empirical evidence,” and that
there “is simply ‘no evidence that juries are incompetent to evaluate
24
expert testimony.’” In this robust discourse, although we read the
12
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21
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trilogy differently than some do, we find much with which to agree.
Conversely, we also find some critiques of the trilogy less than
compelling.
Elsewhere, we have offered a defense, of sorts, of the Daubert
trilogy, or at least an interpretation of how the standards (for
evaluating expertise) that emerge from the trilogy can and do work
25
for judges and lawyers. Briefly, there are clues in Justice Blackmun’s
Daubert opinion that the so-called four-factor test for scientific
26
validity, because it does not constitute “a definitive checklist or test,”
27
should not be overemphasized. Instead, the four factors are merely
general observations, and “many [other] factors” will bear on the
28
determination that valid science was properly applied. Moreover,
the requirement that trial judges must decide, as a preliminary
matter, whether the “methodology properly can be applied to the
29
facts in issue” tempered the recommended focus on “methodology,
30
not . . . conclusions.”
Joiner resolved that apparent inconsistency.
There, the trial judge’s emphasis on proper application (to the case
at hand) was approved on the basis that “conclusions and
31
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” That is,
even when an expert’s methodology is scientific, an “analytical gap
32
between the data and the opinion proffered” may persist. For
scientists and non-scientists alike, the emphasis on application was
confirmed in Kumho Tire, as was the flexibility of the four factor “test”
in Daubert, which “neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts in every case. . . . [S]cientific foundations . . . will be at issue
in some cases. [But] in other cases, the relevant reliability concerns
may focus upon personal knowledge or experience. . . . Too much
depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at

Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2003)
(quoting Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Jury in the Twenty-First Century:
An Interdisciplinary Conference Article: Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121,
1175 (2001)).
25
See generally David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert
Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and not Just the
Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003) (approving of federal
appellate courts’ generally pragmatic approach toward science).
26
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (outlining four factors: testability, peer-reviewed
publication, low error rate, and general acceptance).
27
Id. at 593.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 595.
31
See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 155.
32
See id. at 146.
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issue.” One could thus read Kumho Tire narrowly as holding that it is
relevant for engineers and not “real scientists.” But much like
engineering, whenever science comes into the courtroom, it is as
applied science, not pure theory. For example, in determining
whether the blood at the crime scene is the defendant’s, the court
moves from pure theory to a laboratory technician to the expert, who
combines theory, lab results, personal observations, and informed
judgments that can aid the trier of fact.
Accordingly, as a whole, the Daubert trilogy deflects attention
away from abstract identifications of scientific validity, including the
“demarcation” controversy concerning the elimination of alleged
“junk science” from the courtroom. Instead, attention is directed
toward the application of expertise to the particular “case at hand.”
This emphasis on application is reflected as well in the Seton Hall
Symposium proceedings, which offer three patterns or contours that
provide useful guidance to judges and lawyers. First, there is a
pragmatic recognition, in various forms, that the focus should be on
how science is being used rather than on science in the abstract.
Second, that focus must be accompanied by a modest view of science
rather than an idealized version of its capacity to produce knowledge
for law. Third, the focus on the application phase of expertise must
also be accompanied by a modest view of law itself, including judges,
lawyers, juries, and the evidentiary rules. In the post-trilogy series of
debates, it is far too easy to romanticize the power of science, or the
virtues of the legal system, or both, and to fail to recognize their
practical limitations. Just as romantic images of law often rely on
demonizations of judges untrained in science, overzealous lawyers, or
emotional, uncritical and confused jurors, romantic images of science
are often bolstered by demonizations of forensic scientists, plaintiffs’
experts, or social scientists. Thus, the pragmatic emphasis on
application must be mediated by pragmatic views of both science and
law. Fortunately, the pragmatic aspects of science and law—which we
associate with their local, social, rhetorical, and institutional
features—are most visible in the focus on application. Nevertheless,
the limitations of law and science often recede into the background;
as a result, undue attention is given to red herrings and unrealistic
reform proposals.

33
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II. THE ACTION IS IN THE APPLICATION
[T]he answer to what question is to be asked of the expert postKumho is precisely whatever questions should have been asked
post- (and for that matter pre-) Daubert, to-wit: Does the expert in
fact possess knowledge useful to this trial that is being brought to
bear upon it in a way that increases the probability of accurate
34
outcomes?

The proper emphasis on application in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony is epitomized in the phrase “brought
to bear.” One must focus on the way science is used in the
courtroom, not on science or law in the abstract. Otherwise, there is
a risk, in post-trilogy legal discourse, that one’s scholarly analysis or
reform proposal will “smell of the lamp” and be of no use in the
rather rough area that is a trial—that which looks elegant and
symmetrical in the study can look deformed in the courtroom.
In contemporary post-trilogy discourse, the focus on application
takes numerous forms. For example, Professors Gross and Mnookin,
after noting that “thousands of pages have been written about both
the proper [threshold] criteria for evaluating the reliability of expert
evidence and the institutional competence of judges to evaluate
scientific reliability,” recommend that we examine “another
dimension: the degree of certainty that the expert posits in what she
35
offers.”
One of the central problems with much expert testimony
introduced in court—both scientific and non-scientific alike—is
that experts claim as matters of fact or probability opinions that
should be couched in more cautious terms, as possibilities or
hypotheses.
....
. . . Often, whether testimony is based on scientific study or
more casual forms of observation, what makes an expert’s
conclusion unreliable is that it is expressed with a confidence not
36
warranted by the evidence.

That emphasis on levels of confidence is echoed in Professor Berger’s
sense that “Daubert overemphasizes how the data underlying the
expert’s opinion was produced and distracts courts and counsel from
carefully analyzing what the evidence proves, and how it is being

34

Allen, supra note 12, at 7.
Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence:
A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 143 (2003).
36
Id. at 143-44.
35
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used. Daubert stresses the medium over the message.”
While we agree that careful analysis of what the evidence proves
(and how it is used) is fundamental, we disagree that Daubert,
especially as interpreted in the remainder of the trilogy, detracts from
that task. Assuming that Daubert’s four factors are not “a definitive
checklist,” and that judges must decide whether “methodology
38
properly can be applied to the facts in issue,” the methodological
medium is neither overemphasized nor disconnected from the
expert’s message. To illustrate, the “peer review and publication”
factor is not determinative of admissibility because, as Professor
Moreno points out, that factor in the abstract “tells us nothing
about . . . whether the validity of the published methods or
conclusions is [relevant to] the manner in which this expert proposes
to use the theory or technique to make inferences or draw
39
conclusions in this case.”
Moreover, even some scholars who
disagree over whether Daubert as applied is too restrictive or not
restrictive enough agree on the need to focus on the application
phase. For example, Professor Saks, who is concerned that the value
of much forensic science continues to be exaggerated, summarizes
the elemental conditions of admissibility of expert evidence as
follows: “(a) the opinions and conclusions of the expert are
accompanied by information that enables the factfinder to evaluate
the likely accuracy of the expert’s opinion, and (b) the information is
presented in such a way that factfinders will not . . . excessively
40
[overvalue] the testimony.” Likewise, Professor Friedman—who, in
contrast with Professor Saks, criticizes the Daubert regime as overly
exclusionary—nevertheless recommends that “in some settings . . .
courts should admit expert evidence but explain to the jury factors
limiting the weight that the jury should accord the evidence. . . .
41
Sometimes the . . . court[s] should . . . comment adversely on it.”
Therefore, reliability in the abstract may not be as important as
whether “the expert witness over-claimed the significance of the . . .
42
result” of forensic scientific inquiry. All of these variable expositions
37

Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions Daubert
Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003).
38
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
39
Moreno, supra note 15, at 99.
40
Saks, supra note 18, at 1167.
41
Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (2003).
42
Id. at 1063; see also Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2003) (“I share Professor Friedman’s hope that better
testimony about the limits of forensic science testimony, accompanied by thoughtful
instructions, will lead to better results.”).
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on confidence levels—the manner in which evidence is used, and
whether experts over-claim or juries overvalue—emphasize the
43
application phase of expertise.
Assuming that one focuses on how science is “brought to bear”
in the courtroom, and that one takes a modest and non-romantic
view of both law and science, what are the principal problems and
greatest dangers that we face? Where could improvements be made
that will lead to more accurate decisions? With these questions in
mind, several suggestions made during the Seton Hall Symposium
appear promising. For example, Professor Nance observed that
current “practice is often overly generous to proponents in allowing
opinion on case-specific material facts, ultimate or not, when those
44
facts are not within the personal knowledge of the expert.” In a
similar vein, Professor Berger recommended that because
“[a]dmissibility and sufficiency determinations rest on more than
43

An emphasis on application, rather than on abstract definitions of scientific
reliability, does not necessitate the creation of a “legal science” that does not
correspond to science itself. Professor Nance, for example, appropriately demystifies
the concepts of reliability, testing, and error rates by showing that they are each
matters of degree. Instead of stabilizing an admissibility decision, each simply
generates a question about how much reliability, how much testing (and of what
quality), and how low an error rate is required in the courtroom. See Dale A. Nance,
Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 199-201 (2003).
Nance’s next step, however, is to question why “the final determination . . . be
determined by the norms of the scientific community instead of those of the legal
community . . . ?” Id. at 203. Like Joe Cecil, he avoids the “ephemeral” search for
scientific validity by recommending that courts establish “a legal threshold for
sufficiency that [is] independent of any uniform scientific standard.” Joe S. Cecil,
Construing Science in the Quest for “Ipse Dixit”: A Comment on Sanders and Cohen, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 985, 986 (2003). That task is neither necessitated by the
focus on application nor particularly helpful to the legal process. While “the
reliability criterion should be relative,” and courts certainly must make policy
decisions as to what level of reliability, testing, or error rates are required in court,
“the evidentiary determination regarding expert evidence must take into account—it
must integrate into its foundational premises—the culture of the scientific
method. . . . This needs to be understood as a matter of science policy.” David L.
Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 255, 258-59 (2003). In light of our argument that the focus
on application only works when it is accompanied by a modest view of science (and
of law) as a local, pragmatic enterprise, this is an especially significant point. We are
in complete agreement with Professor Nance’s observation that “scientific validity is
not an all-or-nothing characteristic.” Nance, supra, at 200. We also completely agree
with Joe Cecil’s identification of “the diverse views and values that characterize the
scientific academy.” Cecil, supra, at 985. Therefore, we see no reason to disregard
the pragmatic culture of science in favor of another, and undoubtedly lesser, “legal”
science. Indeed, the basis for such disregard is either an idealization of science as
too good for law (i.e., its standards are too high), or an idealization of law as
somehow better than science.
44
Nance, supra note 43, at 242-43.
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satisfaction of a reliability component[,] they require careful
attention to what the evidence proves and how the trier of fact will
45
use it.”
With respect to fingerprint identification expertise,
Professor Saks confirmed that:
a court must determine what the fingerprint comparison problem
is (a clear and complete latent print versus a tiny fragment versus
a montage of numerous overlaid smeared latents, etc.) and
whether the data show that the expert is likely to be able to
perform that particular type of examination accurately. Under
[Kumho Tire], a court is not to ask about a field in a general and
46
global way.

Hence, the recommendation by Freidman and others, mentioned
47
above, that “[j]udicial comment, expressing reasons to limit the
48
significance of the evidence, [is sometimes] appropriate.”
To be sure, the task of improving the way in which science is
“brought to bear” is not trivial. Rather, it is worth our best efforts to
generate creative suggestions to aid the bench and bar with the
application phase of expertise in the courtroom. Many scholars, in
criticizing existing practices and in their proposals for reform,
acknowledge the significance of the application phase. Nevertheless,
many still fail to possess modest expectations of both science and law.
Too many academics idealize either law or science—respectively
demonizing, on the one hand, courtroom experts, and on the other
hand, judges, lawyers, and juries. Given that law and science are local
and cultural enterprises with practical goals and limitations, a nonromantic, pragmatic approach to both is appropriate.
Idealizing law and/or science prevents one from focusing on the
most important problem associated with the use of science (and
other evidence) at trials. Our own view of the matter accords with
49
that expressed in Schafersman v. Agland Cooperative, where the
Nebraska Supreme Court was
convinced that by shifting the focus to the kind of reasoning
required
in
science—empirically
supported
rational
explanation—the Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Co. trilogy of cases
greatly improves the reliability of the information upon which
verdicts and other legal decisions are based. Because courts and
juries cannot do justice in a factual vacuum, the better
information the fact finders have, the more likely that verdicts will
45
46
47
48
49

Berger, supra note 37, at 1140.
Saks, supra note 18, at 1176.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
Friedman, supra note 41, at 1064.
631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001).
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50

be just.

What we like most about this statement, brought to our attention by
51
Professor Sanders, is its definition of the scientific method as
“empirically supported rational explanation.” Notably, this form of
reasoning should also be at the core of law, journalism, history,
sociology, and any other form of thought that, however distant the
support and uncertain the conclusions, purports to rest conclusions
on facts. This sort of modest, realistic assessment of what science
(and law) should hope to achieve is the only plausible way to identify
the true problems that arise from the use of scientific evidence in
court. Conversely, idealistic pictures of law and science stand in the
way of understanding the real problems.
Furthermore, abstract theorizing about “what is science?” does
not seem profitable. After all, a group of law professors, lawyers, and
judges has a rather remote chance of successfully identifying a set of
useful and cogent criteria that would demark science from non52
science. As noted above, we do not think that Justice Blackmun
intended to construct a definition of science; furthermore, the
crucial precedents do not seem to turn on that inquiry. For example,
in Daubert on remand, Joiner, and Kumho Tire, the judges never stated
that the excluded testimony was the product of “junk science.” In
each of these cases, the judges accepted that the field of expertise
that formed the basis of the excluded testimony was wholly
53
legitimate. On the other hand, in each of these cases, the judges
determined that the application of the expertise, that is, the way in
which the expertise was “brought to bear,” was dubious.
In the next section, we begin by identifying some idealizations of
50

Id. at 876.
See Sanders, supra note 21, at 938 n.246.
52
See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 81 (“The truth is that . . . there is no clear
understanding and agreement about what is meant by ‘science,’ ‘good science,’ or
‘the scientific method.’”).
53
In Daubert on remand, plaintiff’s experts were all deemed to be “experts in
their respective fields”; the “animal studies, chemical structure analyses and
epidemiological data” on which they relied were not in question. One expert,
however, failed to show how his conclusion that Bendectin causes limb defects was
reached. The others could not show causation, but merely a possibility, in this case.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-22 (9th Cir. 1995).
Likewise, in Joiner, the animal studies and the four epidemiological studies which the
plaintiff’s experts relied on were not in question, though a gap existed between that
data and the expert opinion on causation. See 522 U.S. at 144-46. Finally, in Kumho
Tire, the issue “was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual
and tactile inspection . . . . Rather, it was the reasonableness of using that
approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert
testimony was directly relevant.” 526 U.S. at 153-54.
51
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science in recent post-trilogy scholarship. In our analysis of each, we
explore the manner in which romantic images of science deflect
attention away from the application phase, resulting in proposals for
reform that are unworkable. Along the way, we also set forth the
contours of a modest view of science.
III. MODEST VERSUS IDEALIZED VIEWS OF SCIENCE
The closer the empirical focus on the actual workings of science,
and the more current and uncertain the area of science
examined, the more difficult it is to identify simple ideal models
54
of methods and norms.

Certain idealizations of science are easier to detect than others.
To be sure, it is difficult, in light of scientific progress, to locate
persons who view science as merely a social or cultural phenomenon,
not unlike religion or mythology. Similarly, it is not easy to find
persons who view the scientific enterprise as simply an accumulated
body of objective, universal, timeless truth. Nevertheless, between
those extremes, judges and commentators may expect too much from
science in the courtroom. The basis of such expectations is often a
subtle idealization of the scientific enterprise. Although science is
best characterized both by (i) its methodological rigor and
technically efficacious outcomes, and (ii) its social, institutional, and
rhetorical features, an undue focus on the former characteristics can
deflect attention away from the latter.
Baumeister and Capone’s account of post-trilogy expertise, for
example, begins with a modest view of science in law—probabilistic,
55
sometimes shaky, and often uncertain. Their essential argument,
that toxic tort plaintiffs are unfairly disadvantaged by post-trilogy
reliability requirements, concludes by drawing an analogy between
plaintiffs’ experts and Copernicus, whose novel “theories and
research [might not] find their way past the admissibility gates of an
56
increasingly imperial judiciary applying a Daubert analysis.”
Early in the sixteenth century, great thinkers of the Western
World unanimously believed that the earth lay at the center of the
universe . . . .
So deeply held was this belief, that it was
considered heresy to think otherwise. But one man dared to
54

Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, & 44.
55
See Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1032 (stating that epidemiological
and toxicological studies are probabilistic), 1033 (“[E]pidemiological and
toxicological studies are inherently incapable of establishing causation to a
certainty.”).
56
Id. at 1046.

12

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:001

believe otherwise. Nicolaus Copernicus, sitting alone in a turret
and using just his eyes . . . sketched and re-sketched his celestial
57
observations.

This romantic picture, offered with a citation to, inter alia, an
58
Irish Times article, unwittingly represents science as the product of
an individual, standing alone against a community of seemingly great
thinkers; the role of social institutions is either negative or nonexistent. In this story, the social aspects of science belong to the
mainstream scientific community, where strong commitments, leaps
of faith, omission of counterarguments, political strategies, and
religious devotion hinder scientific discovery and progress.
Unfortunately, Copernicus was not alone, did not use only his eyes,
had strong commitments, engaged in leaps of faith, omitted
59
counterarguments, and was both politically astute and religious.
The analogy breaks down because the social, institutional, and
rhetorical aspects of science are not simply impediments to
overcome; inevitably, they are aspects of good science. That is, they
make the best science possible. Naturally, in certain cases, social
factors—such as fraud due to ambition, laboratory carelessness, and
refusal to acknowledge data that contradict a favored theory—serve
as barriers to scientific progress. Nevertheless, the “social” is a
feature of both science’s failures and successes. Significantly,
scientific progress relies on social interaction, institutional support,
and rhetorical strategies, including consensus-building techniques,
persuasion, and governing metaphors and models.
Recognition of science’s social, institutional, and rhetorical
aspects, not as a critique of scientific methodology but rather as an
appreciation of the pragmatic limitations of scientific expertise,
would lead commentators to a modest view of the scientific
enterprise. Conversely, the failure to recognize the inevitable social
57

Id. at 1045.
See id. n.134 (citing Brendan McWilliams, Copernicus and the Centre of the
Universe, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12226971), id. n.136, id. at
1046 n.141.
59
See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, & 63 (“[T]he history of science reveals
that it is common for scientists to have strong commitments to their views during the
early phases of new research. Evaluated in the context of their own time and
[place], the theories of . . . Copernicus relied upon leaps of faith and observations at
the threshold of theoretical plausibility, together with the deliberate omission of
counter arguments.”); see also STEPHEN F. MASON, A HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES 127-34
(1962) (discussing Copernicus’ reliance on conventional methodology; religious,
purposive, and teleological arguments; medieval as well as modern explanations; and
promotion of new values). With respect to Copernicus’ rhetorical strategies and his
interaction with other scientists, see generally JEAN DIETZ MOSS, NOVELTIES IN THE
HEAVENS: RHETORIC AND SCIENCE IN THE COPERNICAN CONTROVERSY (1993).
58
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context of scientific inquiry leads to the subtle idealizations of science
that persist in post-trilogy scholarship. Such romanticizations of
science come in several forms, including reliance on a “deficit model”
of scientific knowledge for law, an overemphasis on methodology as
the marker of good science, and a belief that rooting out “junk
science” is the primary goal of post-trilogy admissibility standards.
Scholars who rely on a deficit model of science tend to view the
courtroom as an institutional space for social conflicts, wherein
interested lawyers hire interested experts and attempt to persuade
judges and juries who are deficient; that is, they lack scientific
60
knowledge. Science, on the other hand, is viewed as a source of
stable, interest-free knowledge. From that perspective, science is not
social like law; at its core, science is neither institutional nor
rhetorical, but is an adjudicator of social conflicts. Critics of the
deficit model, on the other hand, point out that science is like law—
science is just another community, with its own institutions, language,
rhetorical
techniques,
internal
controversies,
gatekeeping
procedures, and credentialing processes. While few would disagree
with that assessment, some scholars in their post-trilogy discourse
write as though science is better than that. Professor Moreno, for
example, who challenges the “task at hand” approach in Kumho Tire,
bases her critique on a perceived lack of judicial understanding of
61
basic scientific concepts.
We have elsewhere challenged the
62
Gatowski study upon which Moreno relies, precisely because that
survey romanticizes scientific methodology, and Moreno’s critique of
the case-specific evaluation of science “as applied” becomes a case in
point. Instead of recognizing that science itself is a local enterprise
with practical goals and limitations even before it enters the
courtroom, Moreno seemingly idealizes science as a linear story of
progress:
A legal decision that is grounded in fact-specific validity (e.g., a
conclusion based on the specific scientific data relied upon by this
expert to reliably explain these facts) is the antithesis of science.
Science, in all of its disciplines, is cumulative and based on a
63
continuing aggregation of new data.

Such an exaggerated view of science is surprising for two
60

For a brief discussion of the deficit model, see Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25,

at 7-8.
61

See Moreno, supra note 15, at 96-98 (citing Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001)).
62
See Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25, at 8-20.
63
Moreno, supra note 15, at 102 (emphasis added).
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reasons. To begin with, the first sentence of the above quotation
seems to actually describe scientific or laboratory inquiry at the prepublication phase—this scientist reaches this conclusion on the basis
of this data to explain these facts. The second sentence quoted above
conflicts with the history of scientific progress: New data is not always
64
cumulative, but often revolutionary. To be fair, Moreno makes the
point that an expert potentially can “prove” something to a jury that
no other scientist would consider valid. In that case, however, there
actually has been no reliable application to a set of facts. Therefore,
when Moreno says that “whether a particular scientific theory or
methodology has been reliably applied to a given set of facts [is]
65
scientifically meaningless,” this only makes sense if a “reliable
application” of methodology to given facts is potentially unreliable by
reference to something else. That something else, according to
Moreno, is global reliability, as opposed to local reliability. To support
that view, Moreno quotes Professor Allen, who observed that a “local”
argument in court must rest on a global epistemological warrant. In
other words, a condition of “local” testimony is global expertise, and
66
“without global reliability, one has gibberish.”
Unlike Moreno,
however, Allen does not explicitly say that an application could be
locally reliable and globally unreliable. Allen says that “accurate
outcomes locally” must rest on a global warrant, and that global
67
validity is a condition for appropriate local testimony. Using the
term “reliable” to refer to an unreliable (because local) application, as
Moreno does, is a misreading of Kumho Tire’s focus on application.
Such a misinterpretation can only be explained by a romantic view of
science as a global source of cumulative knowledge against which
64

See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962).
65
Id. (emphasis added).
66
Id. n.54 (quoting Allen, supra note 12, at 6).
67
See id. We even have our doubts about Professor Allen’s formulation of the
importance of global reliability. Professor Berger, for example, points out that while
microscopic hair analysis can be considered “unreliable because it has not been
tested adequately to satisfy Daubert[,] trained examiners do have some proficiency in
comparing samples accurately . . . .” Berger, supra note 37, at 1134. Even Allen
qualifies his argument:
When I say that it is necessary to establish the “global” issue of
reliability, I am merely saying that virtually all trial testimony will be
embedded in or a part of some larger body of knowledge, and that the
reliability of the testimony will depend in part on the reliability of the
inferentially prior propositions or methodologies involved.
Allen, supra note 12, at 10; see also id. n.24 (“I suspect that this is true of all testimony,
actually.”). Moreover, Allen adds, “[t]he precise contours of the necessary [global]
background will depend on the precise testimony directly relevant to the case that is
being proffered.” Id. at 10.
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local scientists check their conclusions. That, we think, is the
antithesis of science. Science is properly characterized by its
conjectures and refutations, and by its willingness to challenge, in
local settings, the current body of received scientific knowledge.
Reliance on the deficit model leading to idealization of science
is also evident in Professor Sanders’ otherwise insightful article on
68
“paternalism” toward the jury in cases involving expert testimony.
Arguably, compared to Moreno’s, Sanders’ idealization is much more
subtle and harmless.
Given that Sanders seems to view the
gatekeeping effort, which keeps confusing and potentially misleading
expert testimony away from the jury, as a means to “protect” the jury,
his use of the term “paternalism” is problematic. In actuality, the
party against whom evidence is offered is the party requiring
69
protection.
Given that “shap[ing] another’s preferences in ways
70
that bypass the other’s capacity to resist” does not sound protective,
“paternalism” may simply be poor word choice. In any event, Sanders
is concerned with jurors’ ability to understand science. Even as he
provides a superb summary of the conflicting research on jury
confusion, Sanders distinguishes between “central or systematic
processing [wherein] people examine the content of a
communication to assess its validity,” and
peripheral or heuristic processing, [wherein] people do not
attend to the quality and validity of arguments. Rather, they
adopt shortcuts to determine the value of a message. People rely
on factors such as the number of arguments (rather than their
quality), the attractiveness of the communicator, and the
71
communicator’s credentials.

Throughout the remainder of his article, Sanders focuses on
juries’ ability to process scientific knowledge. Sanders’ analysis,
however, presumes that we are trying to deliver scientific knowledge,
of the right quality and validity, into this deficient setting known as
the jury. That approach seems to lack any critical reflection on the
nature of scientific knowledge and discourse. Even among scientists,
68

See generally Sanders, supra note 21.
Sanders explains that “paternalism exists even when the class of persons whose
good is involved is not the same as the class of persons whose freedom is restricted.”
Id. at 897. “Requiring medical doctors to be licensed . . . [is] paternalistic in this
sense. [Such regulation is] intended to protect consumers. Admissibility restrictions
that are justified because they are best for the parties to the litigation, or for the legal
system itself, are paternalistic in the same way.” Id. at 897-98. Perhaps, then, the
exclusionary rules in Sanders’ analysis are not protecting the jury.
70
Id. at 897 (citing DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE
MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 19 (1986)).
71
Id. at 909.
69
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both types of processing exist—scientists adopt shortcuts, such as
reliance on a fellow scientist’s credentials or fidelity to a paradigm,
which the deficit model tends to ignore. Again, rather than viewing
science as “content” to be delivered into a deficient receptacle, we
prefer to see two communities—one scientific, the other “public”—
both characterized by surplus and deficit.
In the end, Sanders finds the evidence inconclusive, despite
numerous studies, as to whether reliability requirements are justified
72
to “shelter jurors from their own shortcomings.”
Though we
contend that reliability requirements shelter the litigants from juror
shortcomings, we understand Sanders’ point: If jurors struggle with
complex scientific arguments such that their decisions are incorrect,
judges ought to intervene as gatekeepers. Of course, Sanders
concedes, not only is there “no research that addresses” the
73
correctness of decisions “under various admissibility regimes,” but
“we probably do not have much agreement about what constitutes a
74
‘correct’ outcome.” Here, Sanders has stumbled upon the deficit
model’s problem.
To illustrate, if a hypothetical observer (who is not a scientist)
had to decide whether complex expertise generally confuses and
misleads jurors, there is no secure scientific knowledge of which the
observer is deficient. Moreover, there is no “central or systematic”
process that can attend to the validity of the arguments pro and con.
Instead, there is a scientific controversy among social scientists, who,
in their respective conclusions, attend not only to methodological
standards, but also to persuasiveness, credentials, and consensus.
Simply stated, this is the manner in which science works. Scientific
practices are
components of craft, or tacit knowledge, over which there is a
negotiated consensus for given times and places during settled
periods of science. . . .
Judgments as to what constitutes
“good” . . . science . . . are social judgments open to dispute and
negotiation, and are affected by considerations such as the status
75
of relevant scientists [and] their research backgrounds.

Once a controversy in science is settled, the result can be
explained, in a sort of post hoc revisionism, as a methodological
victory, and the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science
will recede into the background. In the controversial literature
72
73
74
75

Id. at 891.
Id. at 899.
Sanders, supra note 21, at 931.
Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, & 30.
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(concerning juries and expertise) discussed by Sanders, however, the
social is quite visible. Due to Sanders’ persistent focus on juror
deficits, however, the social is also ignored.
Even among scholars who do not fall prey to the deficit model,
characterizing science singularly as methodological often eclipses
science’s social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects. Professor Neil
Cohen, for example, in his commentary on evidentiary gatekeeping
by judges, uses the popular metaphor of the “black box” to describe
the process by which data is given to an expert, who draws
conclusions by an “analysis [that] takes place out of sight of the
76
factfinders.”
An example of that model might be . . . a . . . handwriting expert,
who is given samples[,] . . . analyzes them, and pronounces the
document [in question] to have been written (or not . . . ) by the
defendant. While the expert might recite the factors that lead . . .
to the conclusion, the process by which those factors are weighed
and balanced, as well as the justification for using those factors
77
and not others, takes place in the expert’s mind.

By contrast, for Cohen, “the testimony of epidemiologists and
scientists using similar methods . . . is based on expertise that takes
place in a ‘clear box’ in which the entire thought process of the
78
expert can be monitored and assessed.” Significantly, however, the
metaphor of the black box can be used in many different ways.
Among sociologists (of science), the conventional use of the term
“black box” is to describe the manner in which scientific discourse
79
hides its social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects.
From a
scientistic perspective, one should focus on hypothesis, data,
methodology, and result. Consequently, the “surrounding” or
“contextual” factors such as personality, markers of credibility,
funding, consensus-building processes, and values are “black-boxed”
as insignificant. In Cohen’s account of the black box, however, once
we focus in court on the thought process of the expert—theory, data,
methodology—we now have a “clear box.” From the perspective of a
sociologist or historian of science, this is a “black-boxing” maneuver.
In other words, science itself has been idealized as an almost
mechanical producer of knowledge, while the expert, along with the
76

Cohen, supra note 16, at 960.
Id.
78
Id. at 961.
79
See David S. Caudill, Barely Opening, Then Slamming Shut, Science’s “Black Box” in
Law: A Response to Beecher-Monas’s Heuristics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1795, 1796 (2002)
(citing Langdon Winner, Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding It
Empty, 16 SCI. AS CULTURE 427, 431 (1993)).
77
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expert’s social authority, institutional status, and rhetorical strategies,
has disappeared. Following his idealization of science, Cohen argues
that since scientific standards are too high for law, expert opinions
80
that would not qualify as “real” science should be allowed into court.
Joe Cecil, in his response to Cohen’s analysis, adopts an
appropriately modest view of science. Cecil acknowledges the
ephemerality of “scientific validity” and “the diverse views and values
that characterize the scientific academy—one science’s accepted
81
methodology may be another science’s ipse dixit.” In his analysis of
82
Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp.,
Cecil highlights the
disagreements among the three independent experts in the case,
whose varying standards resulted in different assessments of
83
causation.
Soldo reveals [that a] court must reconcile conflicting values of
numerous sciences, each with differing intellectual processes,
differing assumptions, and differing degrees of tolerance for
extrapolation from scientific studies to human circumstances. . . .
Even when free of distortions imposed by the legal forum [e.g.,
party sponsorship or adversarial presentation], distinguished
scholars from different disciplines will invoke diverse standards
84
and practices in assessing evidence.

The above statement both criticizes the notion that scientific
methodology is a uniform or singular marker of reliability or validity,
and confirms the scientific enterprise’s pragmatic and socially
contingent character. Cecil, however, focuses on the Soldo trial
judge’s rejection of the notion that experts need only meet “the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice” of others in
85
the field. In the court’s words, while
it is sometimes necessary in a clinical, regulatory, or business
practice to make decisions based on less than sufficient and/or
reliable scientific evidence due to practical demands requiring
immediate decision-making, such guesses, although perhaps
reasonable hypotheses based on the best available evidence, do
not constitute a scientifically reliable approach when used to
86
assess causality via the scientific method.
80

See Cohen, supra note 16, at 949 (“Science . . . routinely uses filters that prevent
its experts from reaching exactly the sort of opinions . . . that should be utilized in a
civil trial.”).
81
See Cecil, supra note 43, at 985.
82
244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
83
See Cecil, supra note 43, at 973-80.
84
Id. at 984.
85
See id. at 985.
86
Id. at 984.
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That judicial perspective conflicts with the views of scholars like
87
Cohen, who advocate lowering post-trilogy reliability requirements.
Nonetheless, that perspective is shared by those trial judges who tend
to idealize science and who are reversed (by appellate panels who
have a pragmatic view of science) for demanding more of science
88
than it can reasonably offer. From the standpoint of those who
idealize science, the post-trilogy reliability standards are too low. But
why would Cecil, having recognized that “validity” is ephemeral and
methodologies diverse, agree with such a distinction between the
lofty notions of reliability/method and the mere “guessing” that
scientists engage in everywhere except in the courtroom? One
possible explanation is that when describing the variations between
the independent experts in Soldo, Cecil focuses primarily on their
methodological variations, not their extra-methodological intellectual
processes, assumptions, and values. Instead of acknowledging the
social, institutional, and rhetorical variables that drive science, each
discipline of science, viewed in isolation, is seen as primarily
methodological. Perhaps Cecil does not take seriously the notion
that some of science’s best processes, assumptions, and values are not
methodological. On the other hand, Cecil realizes that the trial
judge’s call for “a scientifically reliable approach” using “the scientific
method” is not scientific at all, but is a legal standard dressed up as a
scientific standard. Therefore, a more cogent explanation is that
Cecil does, in fact, recognize the instability and pragmatism of
science. On that point, Cecil does not completely share the Soldo
court’s idealization of science. Instead, Cecil admires the court’s
unwitting idealization of law as better and more demanding than
science. We will return to Cecil’s idealization of law in the next
section, but its contrast with Cohen’s idealization of science is
evident. In Cohen’s view, since science filters out too much of what
law needs, law should apply lower reliability standards than those of
science itself. In Cecil’s modest view of science, on the other hand,
since science’s own standards are too low for law, law should apply
higher standards. While we agree with Cecil’s modest view of science,
we believe his idealization of law, as capable of doing a better job,
leads him away from a proper focus on application and toward an
abstract ideal of validity, albeit legal instead of scientific.
Finally, a third type of idealization of science in post-trilogy
scholarship takes the form of casual references to so-called “junk
science.” James Shellow, for example, in his commentary on the
87
88

See Cohen, supra note 16, at 963.
See Caudill & LaRue, supra note 25, at 24-36.
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limits of cross-examination of experts, begins by identifying “junk
scientists” who were supposed to be exposed in “Daubert and Kumho
hearings,” who “[u]nfortunately . . . appear on the stand well-dressed
89
and articulate,” and who “believe in their junk science.” Shellow
90
subsequently refers to “the now legendary junk science,” but his use
of the term “legendary” is more appropriate than he might realize.
Professor Mansfield has already condemned the “campaign of
sloganeering, employing such labels as ‘junk science’ . . . aimed at
casting scorn on those who testified to opinions thought to warrant
these labels. It is embarrassing to concede that this kind of
91
sloganeering may have influenced the course of the law.”
The
point, of course, is not that all proffered expertise is adequate. There
is widespread acknowledgement that some experts and some
expertise are not worthy of the courtroom. Rather, the “model that
posits junk science as distinguishable from . . . “good science” . . . is a
flexible, politically charged framework that . . . plays a strategic,
rhetorical role in the agendas of many who attempt to address the
92
pervasive perception of an ongoing legal crisis.”
As Professors Edmond and Mercer demonstrate, the “junk
science” model relies on “untenable images of efficacy, methods,
93
norms, and motivations as hallmarks of ‘good science.’” The term
“junk science,” lacking any consistent meaning, functions more as an
ideal or image for those who
(i) oversimplify the relationship between scientific knowledge and
94
technically efficacious outcomes;
(ii) view “factors like financial opportunism [as] hallmarks of junk
science, [when] in reality such factors provide powerful motors
95
for many fields of contemporary science”;
(iii) consider scientific norms prescribing that scientists be
detached, impersonal, self-critical, and open-minded as “necessary
89

James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 317,
317 (2003).
90
Id. at 319 (quoting Allen, supra note 12, at 5).
91
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 82.
92
Edmond & Mercer, supra note 54, && 1, 3-4.
93
Id. & 9.
94
See id. & 16 (“Any simple linkage between science and practice is . . .
undermined when we consider the reworking and simplification of scientific
knowledge as it moves from abstract theorizing into standardized forms sufficient to
fulfill a technological function.”).
95
Id. & 23 (“Unlike the impression conveyed by junk science model proponents,
in actuality scientists frequently find themselves in a competitive environment where
strong emotional commitment to their views and sensitivity to finance and funding
are essential to career progression—even academic and institutional survival.”).
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96

feature[s] of doing scientific work”; and
(iv) assume that “a simple, identifiable, universal scientific
97
method . . . guides [scientific] activity.”

In short, the very mention of junk science, unless it is qualified
immediately with carefully examined examples, signals a
romanticization of science as method and a corresponding failure to
acknowledge the social context of even the best science as constitutive.
In recent appraisals of the use of forensic science in criminal
cases, the recognition of the “social” as positive or fruitful is evident.
Professor Margaret Berger, for example, describes DNA typing as
“the by-product of cutting-edge science,” as opposed to “forensic
specialties which originated within the law enforcement
98
community . . . to facilitate investigations and prosecutions.” The
distinction between cutting-edge science and “courtroom” science
might appear to support an argument that the latter is “social”—
motivated, biased (toward prosecution), and interested—as opposed
to the former as relatively objective or “natural.” In her historical
narrative concerning DNA typing, however, Berger speaks of that
method’s universal ratification by the scientific community, of
scientists serving on committees to monitor the use of DNA typing in
trials, of reports issued by the National Academy of Sciences, of shifts
in laboratory technologies, of impliedly valid disputes concerning
“appropriate probabilities and . . . how they should be expressed,” of
the need for proper collection and analysis of genetic markers,
quality control, and documentation protocols in laboratories, and of
99
“proficiency testing of laboratory personnel.”
Two observations
about this list can be made. First, each of the listed phenomena is
decidedly social, institutional, or rhetorical (not simply
methodological): community ratification, committees, institutional
reports, evolving technologies and protocols, disputes, document
writing, and credentialing. Second, these social features of DNA
typing have generated good, not bad, science; without the elaborate
social process that Berger documents, DNA typing would not have
made the progress that it has. Note, however, that Berger does not
idealize nuclear DNA testing—”the gold standard for expert proof”—
because it “may, under some circumstances, produce results that are
96

Id. && 25-26 (citing MICHAEL MULKAY, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE 64 (1979)).
97
Id. && 28-29 (“[S]tandards of proof, models, acceptable error rates, and
observation . . . vary substantially from one branch of science to the next.”).
98
Berger, supra note 37, at 1126.
99
Id. at 1126-29.
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100

completely wrong.”
Reliability in the abstract, therefore, is not
enough. For admissibility and sufficiency determinations, the focus
should be on “what the evidence proves and how the trier of fact will
101
use it.”
In his critique of experts who peddle “tainted or fraudulent
science,” Professor Paul Giannelli offers a similar description of good
102
science.
Giannelli summarizes the recommendations of the
Inspector General’s 1997 report on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) laboratory, which criticized inaccurate,
incompetent, and poorly documented testimony, as including:
(1) seeking accreditation of the FBI laboratory by the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation
Board; (2) requiring examiners . . . to have scientific
backgrounds . . . (3) mandating the preparation . . . of separate
reports instead of having one composite report . . . (4)
establishing report review procedures . . . (5) preparing adequate
case files . . . (6) monitoring court testimony . . . and (7)
103
developing written protocols for scientific procedures.

Again, the keys to legitimate scientific inquiry are the social, not
just methodological, aspects of science (institutional accreditation,
credentialing, review of documentation, and procedural
conventions).
Institutions, community oversight, persuasive
documentation, and the social “capital” represented by credentials
are the cure for mediocre science and the route to scientific progress.
In light of these accounts, the counterargument, that the social,
institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science are secondary to
science’s real or methodological work (hypothesis, data, and testing),
rings hollow.
Finally, we should mention Professor Christopher Slobogin’s
recent commentary on expertise in criminal cases, which concedes
the difficulties faced by defendants using social scientists in the
exclusionary post-trilogy regime (for example, that error rates are
hard to generate because of multiple variables, and the practical and
104
ethical limitations on experimentation).
Slobogin notes that

100

Id. at 1140.
Id.
102
Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1107 (quoting BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED 246 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Id. at 1108 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, THE
FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997)).
104
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 108-16.
101
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“[r]esearch requires money[,]” and “[t]he state has more of it”:

105

The state not only has more money, but it is better equipped, in
an institutional sense, to use it. . . . [T]he state is better able to
anticipate the scientific issues that will arise and act accordingly.
Indeed, Daubert and Kumho Tire have already stimulated massive
federal efforts to validate the type of forensic evidence typically
106
relied upon by the prosecution.

The resources of defense-oriented academic researchers “pale
107
when compared to the government’s.” In this context, Slobogin is
not criticizing prosecution-oriented science for its interest, bias, or
motivation; rather, Slobogin contends that methodology needs
institutional support. Money and other resources are, almost always,
108
conditions for the production of scientific expertise.
Given that most idealizations of science identified in this section
are quite subtle, they resemble unfortunate tendencies more than
dangerous narratives concerning courtroom expertise. To illustrate,
Professors Gross and Mnookin readily acknowledge that “the level of
confidence the expert witness expresses” is as important as
109
methodology, which helps refocus attention on the application
phase rather than threshold reliability. Nonetheless, as they begin to
discuss non-scientific evidence, Gross and Mnookin observe:
At least compared to alternative forms of knowledge-production,
research science involves formalized methodological norms,
articulated standards, and conscious research design. By contrast,
many forms of potential expert knowledge—from the clinical
doctor’s diagnosis to the historian’s description to the tire safety
expert’s analysis—are based on experience, tacit knowledge, even
110
hunch.

While recognizing that qualitative differences surely exist
between highly replicable research designs and mere theories based
on interesting but minimal data, Gross and Mnookin hint that the
best science rises above subjectivity. The contrast is not so sharp,
however, because “experience, tacit knowledge, [and] even hunch”
alternatively generate our “formalized methodological norms,
105

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
107
Id.
108
Moreover, while Slobogin comes close to idealizing the “positivistic” hard
sciences by repetitive contrast to the “socially-constructed” soft sciences, he is actually
a critic of strict reliability standards. Slobogin maintains that the standards lead to
unfairness (toward criminal defendants) and to less reliable outcomes because lessthan-ideal science is better than no defense-oriented science at all. See id. at 118.
109
Gross & Mnookin, supra note 35, at 188.
110
Id. at 142-43.
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articulated standards, and conscious research design.”
Consensus
concerning methodological norms and standards is tacit knowledge.
Research designs draw on experience and sometimes rely on a hunch
as to what might work better. The appropriate distinction, therefore,
is not between methodology and experience, but rather between
experience that leads to promising research and experience that does
not. The unwitting attempt to sanitize science of its fruitful and
supportive social context not only leads to a romanticized vision of
the scientific enterprise, but unjustifiably minimizes the application
phase’s significance. The application phase is a social context
wherein the practical goals and limitations of methodology and
“reliability” are visible.
A focus on the application phase of expertise is both appropriate
and useful, so long as one maintains a modest view of both science
and law. In light of this thesis, we should also note that a modest view
of science by itself—one without a focus on application and/or a
modest view of law—is less than helpful. This point can best be
demonstrated by comparing three Seton Hall Symposium articles
whose authors share a modest view of science. Other than this shared
viewpoint, however, these authors disagree and become side-tracked
into positions that do not help solve the problems of admissibility of
expertise in the courtroom.
To illustrate, Professor Mansfield’s position epitomizes the
modest view of science. He was an early critic of Daubert’s emphasis
112
on Popper’s falsifiability criterion, and remains convinced that
adopting “science” as a legal category was “a fundamental error”:
Daubert [held] that to be “science,” evidence had to be
“scientifically valid” or “good science,” and that this sort of science
could only be the result of the “scientific method.” The truth is
that . . . there is no clear understanding and agreement about
what is meant by “science,” “good science” or “the scientific
113
method.”

In response to recent concerns about “scientific validity” and
reliability, a certain probative value is now required prior to
admissibility. For Mansfield, this requirement is “a grave impairment
114
of jury trials,” and unnecessary because the rules of evidence
115
Prior to
already excluded evidence that might mislead the jury.
111

Id. at 143.
See generally John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1 (1996).
113
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 81.
114
Id. at 84-85.
115
See id. at 84; see also id. at 79 (“Exclusion on the grounds of prejudice,
112
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Daubert, admissibility, based solely on the expert’s qualification and
116
Even Frye’s “general
the relevance of his testimony, was easier.
acceptance” criteria “appeared to be restricted to ‘novel’ scientific
117
evidence.”
But now, under the force of (i) powerful economic
interests whose servants initiated the campaign against “junk science,”
(ii) judges who want to be associated with prestigious scientific
knowledge, (iii) scientists who disapprove of inferior courtroom
118
science, and (iv) an ideological distrust of juries, we are left with a
119
120
“conceptual muddle” and with “[c]onfusion and conflict.”
We admire Professor Mansfield’s modest assessment of science
121
and the scientific method in his critique of Daubert, and will address
what we perceive to be his idealization of law and especially the jury,
in Part IV, below. Notably, Professor Christopher Mueller, instead of
criticizing Daubert, actually finds in that opinion a modest view of the
scientific enterprise:
[Alongside] an apparent belief that science is a static body of
objective knowledge reflecting certainty . . . we also find in Daubert
suggestions that (a) science is a process, hence anything but
static; (b) scientific knowledge does not reflect certainty, but is
uncertain and contingent; and (c) scientific expertise is affected
by the forces that generate litigation, hence [it is] subjective in
122
some respects, and socially constructed.

In contrast to Mansfield, however, Mueller argues that we need a
Daubert-type validity standard, as “[w]e can make the judgment that
not all evidence that is presented as science, even by qualified
witnesses, is of such quality that it can be relied upon . . . . We can
believe that such evidence varies in quality, and that sometimes it is
123
not reliable enough.”
Mueller, predictably, observes that juries
124
“have trouble with complex cases, and with scientific evidence,” and
that more educated and experienced judges “can do better than
125
juries in separating what should count from what should not.” Even
confusion of issues, waste of time and so forth [are] catalogued in Rule 403.”).
116
See id. at 77-78.
117
Id. at 79.
118
Id. at 82-83.
119
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 77.
120
Id. at 87.
121
See id. at 83 (“[T]here does not exist outside the law any settled meaning for
[these] terms.”).
122
Mueller, supra note 6, at 1007 (emphasis added).
123
Id. at 991; see also id. at 1001 (“[P]roof should be excluded when it is thin, and
looking directly at the science seems a good thing, not a bad thing.”).
124
Id. at 992.
125
Id. at 993 (“[T]he very fact that a court admits evidence that is daunting or
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though Mueller and Mansfield agree that “reliability is not an all-or126
nothing concept, but a relative concept,” that assessment standing
alone does not lead to agreement concerning the vices and virtues of
the Daubert trilogy.
Indeed, a third possibility might follow from a modest
assessment of the scientific enterprise, namely the (technically
correct, but easily exaggerated) view that mainstream science
sometimes produces “junk” and, impliedly, novel science is often
superior:
The real issue is determining what junk science is, especially
during an era of constantly evolving scientific developments.
Remember, it was not too long ago that . . . [a]rguments were
made that research linking cigarettes to lung cancer were “junk.”
Similarly, . . . [i]t was not until the late seventies that the world
learned that [asbestos] was lethal in dust form. Again, early
studies . . . would have been labeled “junk” science by today=s
127
standards.

Here, the views of Baumeister and Capone are distinct from those of
both Mueller, whose validity standard makes no distinction between
mainstream and novel science, and Mansfield, who sees the utility of
128
a validity standard only with respect to novel science.
For
Baumeister and Capone, reliability standards are dangerous; lives are
lost to diseases like cancer and asbestosis when “incriminating expert
evidence [is] subjected to a preliminary review by a trial court
129
today[.]”
Apart from demonstrating why a modest assessment of science
does not entail any particular view of the Daubert trilogy, the
foregoing examples also variously illustrate both why we should focus
on application, not on science in the abstract, and why a modest view
of science must be accompanied by a modest view of law. We have no
criticism of Mansfield’s view of science. However, his idealization of
the jury, discussed in Part IV, below, interferes with his ability to offer
guidance to judges and lawyers. In effect, Mansfield posits that the
complex conveys to jurors and unspoken message of invitation, suggesting that they
can rely on it.”).
126
Id. at 1010; cf. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 81 (“[A]mong . . . scientists, there is
no clear understanding or agreement about what is meant by . . . ‘good science’. . . .
Furthermore scientists who might be willing to give an account of how they go about
their work, would probably disclaim responsibility for attaching any great
significance to their account beyond its justifying the decisions they make regarding
further research.”).
127
Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1026.
128
See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
129
Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1044.
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Daubert trilogy is hopeless: misguided, unpredictable, and
130
unconstitutional.
Mueller, on the other hand, is wildly hopeful. We have no
criticism of Mueller’s initial and overt modest assessment of science—
that scientific evidence offers possibilities and probabilities, and
131
“much scientific knowledge is fluid and contestable.”
Two aspects
of Mueller’s analysis, nevertheless, concern us. At the outset, Mueller
appears to have no proposals for reform. He defends the Daubert
trilogy’s restrictive regime on the bases that judges are more
competent than juries, that gatekeeping is necessary for reliability,
132
and that the Court’s definition of science is balanced. Nevertheless,
as discussed in Part IV, below, Mueller rejects the abuse-of-discretion
standard on the basis of an idealized notion of appellate review.
More to the point, with respect to his initial modest view of science,
Mueller’s analysis proceeds toward a subtle idealization of science.
This takes the form of downplaying the social, institutional, and
rhetorical aspects of science in favor of its methodological rigor. For
example, at the end of his defense of Daubert, Mueller confirms his
seemingly modest view of the scientific enterprise:
Behind the numbers [the product of analysis of the quantification
of scientific data] are more and real uncertainties—the ones that
go with designing tests, selecting cohorts, trying to eliminate
differences apart from the factor in issue that might account for
observed differences. . . . [I]t is hard or impossible to eliminate
confounding variables, and . . . even promising results might not
be replicable. . . .
And there [are] self-serving human
133
motivations . . . .

These aspects of science, however, are not presented by Mueller
as characteristics of genuine science; rather, they are reasons to be
134
cautious, and reasons why “science insists on impressive numbers.”
Even more telling, Mueller’s footnote to the above quotation does
not cite to historians, philosophers, or sociologists of science who
elucidate the inevitable social, rhetorical, and institutional aspects of
“good” science. Instead, Mueller refers to a New York Times article
130

See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 77 (explaining that our “state of affairs . . . may
fairly be described as a conceptual muddle containing within it a threat to liberty and
popular participation in government”), 87 (“It is difficult to predict the future. It is
impossible to imagine that the Court will dismantle the Daubert-Kumho regime . . . .
There seems little possibility of legislative intervention or of any remedial
proposal . . . . Confusion and conflict may increase . . . .”).
131
Mueller, supra note 6, at 990-91.
132
See id. at 989-1018.
133
Id. at 1018.
134
Id.
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decrying epidemiology as “crude and inexact,” and to a Chronicle of
Higher Education article about the seven signs of “bogus science”—
pitching claims to the media (rather than to peer-reviewed journals),
identifying a powerful establishment that suppresses novel research,
135
claiming hard-to-detect effects, and so forth.
A distinction,
therefore, between “genuine” and “junk” science—and not merely
between “better” and “worse” science—creeps back into Mueller’s
analysis.
In defending Daubert against critics who argue on
philosophical grounds that the case is analytically defective and
incoherent, Mueller praises the mediation or compromise between
the goals of objectivity and the more modest views of Popper and
136
Kuhn —neither of whom are representative of contemporary
science and technology studies, the sociology of scientific knowledge,
or of rhetoricians and social historians of science. All of this suggests
that Mueller does not take seriously the view that all of science, even
as it succeeds in modeling nature and making accurate predictions, is
social, historical, and rhetorical. Although this idealization of science
is subtle, it is just enough to prevent Mueller from seeing the
problem with focusing on demarcation and admissibility rather than
application.
IV. MODEST VERSUS IDEALIZED VIEWS OF LAW
In the Seton Hall Symposium, some solutions to the perceived
challenges (for lawyers and judges) generated by the trilogy often
took the form of idealizing a particular element of the trial—perhaps
the process of appellate review, the trial judge, the jury, or even the
capacity of experts to communicate appropriate legal standards to
the jury. Like idealizations of science, idealizations of law tend to
deflect attention away from the application phase. In the “case at
hand,” notions of reliability and validity intersect with confidence
levels and the pragmatic goals and limitations of scientific inquiry.
Moreover, just as idealizations of science are bolstered by
downplaying or demonizing (as unscientific) the social aspects of
science, idealizations of particular features of law often rely on
demonizations of other aspects: appellate panels correct the unruly
discretion of trial judges; trial judges correct the deficiencies of the
jury; juries correct adversarial excess or exaggerated expertise, and so
forth. Failure to recognize the realistic limits of law, as well as
science, will result in impractical reform proposals.
In his defense of the trilogy, Professor Mueller provides a
135
136

Id. at 1018 n.80.
See id. at 1007-10.

2004

EXPERT TESTIMONY

29

137

valuable “reality check.”
In an acute dissection of professorial
fallacies in post-trilogy scholarship, Mueller illustrates how some of
the “bad” rules supposedly established in the trilogy simply do not
138
exist.
But then, in a less realistic moment, Mueller suggests that
appellate review of admissibility decisions (concerning expertise)
139
should be de novo. Mueller is convinced that the abuse-of-discretion
standard, confirmed in Joiner and Kumho Tire, will lead to an
unfortunate lack of uniformity:
[I]ssues relating to the validity of theories and techniques
transcend the facts of individual cases.
This observation
applies . . . to the question whether DNA profiling can reliably
identify a blood or fluid sample as having very likely come from
one person . . . . It applies to the question whether proffered
statistical proof should satisfy the standard that scientists would
require, to the question whether differential diagnosis[,] . . .
animal studies . . . [or] . . . similarities between . . . chemical
structures . . . can prove causation. Questions of this magnitude
need steadier guidance than the abuse-of-discretion standard
provides, and the answers that courts reach should be applied in
140
similar cases. . . .

In our view, the phrase “abuse of discretion” is indeed notorious
for its elasticity of meaning; appellate courts regularly reverse trial
judges and administrative agencies under this heading. Lack of
uniformity, however, in deciding cases is not an evil unless the cases
are indistinguishable. If the appropriate question in cases involving
scientific expertise is primarily how science is “brought to bear” in a
particular case, and not scientific reliability in general, then the
reliability ruling in any particular case is likely to be easily
distinguishable from other rulings.
At the Seton Hall Symposium, the Honorable Chief Judge
Gibbons of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
now retired, engaged in a more careful and nuanced discussion of
“the respective roles of trial courts and appellate courts with respect
141
to the admissibility of . . . expert . . . evidence . . . .” Judge Gibbons
begins his discussion by noting three complications concerning
appellate review of evidentiary rulings—namely, the harmless-error
137

See generally Mueller, supra note 6.
See, e.g., id. at 996-1001 (explaining that supposed rules that (i) require
doubling of incremented risk for epidemiological evidence and (ii) disallow
differential diagnosis evidence to show causation, are not settled).
139
See id. at 1019-22.
140
Id. at 1020-21.
141
Gibbons, supra note 10, at 128.
138
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rule, the trial judge’s fact-finding on preliminary questions, and the
142
Judge Gibbons then contrasts these
abuse-of-discretion standard.
complications with the rather straightforward legal principle that
appellate review of a summary judgment or a directed verdict is
143
plenary. The contrast between review of evidentiary rulings and the
plenary review of summary judgments is generally defensible. As
Judge Gibbons points out, however, a trial judge’s decision to exclude
an expert’s testimony may remove all of the evidence on a critical
144
element of a claim.
In such a case, there is little or no practical
difference between the evidentiary ruling and a summary judgment
ruling.
One response to this difficulty would be to argue, like Professor
Mueller does, that the distinction should be abolished. Judge
145
Gibbons is tempted to simply do so.
But instead, he reviews the
relevant precedent in his own circuit, especially the opinions of Judge
Becker, and concludes that the scope of review for evidentiary rulings
146
“is not a simple matter.”
While criticizing Joiner’s hard line as a
147
“pure, simple, unvarnished abuse of discretion” standard of review,
Judge Gibbons identifies ambiguities in that opinion due to “the
absence of a nuanced definition of abuse of discretion, a definition
including legal error, procedural irregularity, disregard of evidence
that should have been considered, and clearly erroneous factual
determinations. Any one of these ought to lead to a statement that
148
there was an abuse of discretion.” Moreover, explaining that Rules
149
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence “require the
determination of what, in most or many cases, will be a mixed
question of law and fact,” Judge Gibbons concludes that review of
150
such determinations should be plenary.
If the abuse-of-discretion
“standard” is already as elastic as Judge Gibbons claims, however, his
conclusion need not follow.
142

Id.
Id. at 129.
144
Id.
145
See id. at 134.
146
Id. at 133.
147
Gibbons, supra note 10, at 136.
148
Id. at 139.
149
See FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring that testimony that will assist trier of fact to
understand evidence or to determine fact in issue is admissible if qualified expert
bases testimony on sufficient data, uses reliable methods, and applies methods
reliably); FED. R. EVID. 703 (stating that facts or data relied upon for expert opinion
need not be admissible, but if their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect,
otherwise inadmissible facts or data may be disclosed).
150
Gibbons, supra note 10, at 139.
143
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Professor Mueller argues for plenary review on the bases that (i)
“issues relating to the validity of theories and techniques transcend
151
the facts of individual cases” and require uniformity; (ii) three (or
152
more) minds are better than one; and (iii) trial judges need
153
guidance. Nevertheless, Mueller concedes that with respect to the
application phase, “some degree of deference” to trial judges is
warranted:
FRE 702 indicates that judges are to consider “principles and
methods” and the sufficiency of underlying “facts or data,” and
also the question whether the expert “has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts,” and Kumho Tire makes it clear
that the focus is the “task at hand” . . . . To the extent that the
admissibility decision actually focuses . . . on . . . laboratory
protocol . . . or . . . discrepancy in the data . . . some degree of
deference to the decision of the trial judge is in order. It is with
larger questions, including those of theory and technique . . . that
154
closer scrutiny is warranted.

On the other hand, if the action is in the application, then most
cases require discretion. Mueller’s plenary review is justified only by
his twin idealization of the appellate judiciary as more relaxed and
155
reflective and of science as a source of transcendent knowledge of
valid theories and techniques. Judge Gibbons’ idealization of
appellate review is more measured. But unlike Professor Mueller,
Judge Gibbons justifies plenary review especially in cases mixing law
156
and fact—in his words, “in many if not most cases.” Both Mueller
and Judge Gibbons are correct as to some cases. Still, as the all-purpose
solution, invoking plenary review is an oversimplification based on an
idealization of the appellate judiciary. Although “abuse of discretion”
is a flexible concept worthy of Professor Mueller’s and Judge
Gibbons’ critical attention, plenary review is also a flexible practice.
In addition to idealizations of appellate review (to correct
deficient judges), some scholars at the Seton Hall Symposium
idealized the jury. Professor Mansfield, for example, argued that the
rules of evidence have been, are, and should be oriented to the

151

Mueller, supra note 6, at 1020.
See id. at 1021.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 1022.
155
See id. at 1021 (“[A]ppellate review goes forward in a setting less subject to
severe scheduling pressures. . . . Reviewing courts can even take judicial notice of
technical books, articles, and other materials.”).
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157

admission of all relevant evidence.
Thus, the trilogy’s reliability
158
requirement for admissibility ends up as an embarrassing error.
Moreover, given that the reliability requirement leads judges to
invade the province of the jury, for Mansfield, this error has
159
constitutional dimensions.
Mansfield’s idealization of the jury is clearest in his distinction
160
between Rule 403 and the trilogy’s reliability requirement.
Mansfield sees Rule 403 as directed against the evils that
the jury will ignore the substantive law, the jury will disregard the
burden of proof, the jury will be swept away by emotion, and so
forth. These evils can be seen as such and taken into account
through the exclusion of evidence without attacking the very
reason for having [a] jury trial: that the verdict may reflect beliefs
about the world held by ordinary people and the working of
161
average intelligences.

The distinction, however, between the listed “evils” and the reason for
jury trials is difficult to sustain. Suppose an attorney attempts to
inflame the jury’s passion so that jurors will “ignore the substantive
law” and “disregard the burden of proof.” Why might the attorney
succeed? Would it not be because jurors had “beliefs about the
world” that would lead them to be susceptible to a passionate appeal?
“Inflammatory” remarks only work by appealing to stereotypes held
by ordinary people. Thus, insisting that we preserve ordinary beliefs
about the world seems naive.
To bolster his idealization of the jury, Mansfield also demonizes
those who hope the trilogy’s reliability requirements will improve the
accuracy of adjudication. As Mansfield sees it, the trilogy is the
product of
powerful economic interests[,] . . . the desire of some judges to be
associated with science, . . . the anger and scorn [of] elite
scientists [toward law’s use of ‘bad science’ and] an ideology, far
from decisively eliminated in our political debates, which cannot
see the sense in entrusting to twelve persons picked at random
from the general population important and difficult questions of
162
fact.

Singled out as an ideologue, Professor Allen is allegedly guilty of the
fourth count in Mansfield’s indictment.
Allen’s emphasis on
157
158
159
160
161
162

See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 77-84.
See id. at 84.
See id. at 83-84.
See id. at 79.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 82-83.
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accuracy in trials rests on the “conviction that jury verdicts are not as
accurate as other forms of adjudication and that there are no good
policy reasons why an inferior form of fact-finding should be
163
accepted.”
164
His
Mansfield’s modest view of science is one of the best.
exaggeration of the jury’s role, however, interferes with his ability to
recognize the virtues of Kumho Tire’s focus on the jury trial’s
application stage. Though Mansfield suggests that Kumho Tire is
incompatible with respect for the jury, one can admire both Kumho
Tire and the jury system: Judge plus jury is superior to judge or jury
alone. The rules of evidence, enforced by a judge, can lead to
presenting better evidence to a jury than otherwise would be
presented. Better evidence is more likely to lead to better decisions.
The difficulty lies in formulating the best working relationship
between counsel, judge, and jury.
Insofar as Baumeister and Capone’s idealization of the jury relies
on the argument that judges and juries are equally inept when it
comes to science, it perhaps should not be referred to as an
“idealization.” In their words, “[w]hile there is little research data in
the area, studies suggest that the ability of judges and jurors to make
correct inferences from probability data are both poor, and
165
specifically, that the judges are not superior to jurors.” Instead of
166
acknowledging, as Sanders does, the conflicting evidence regarding
juror confusion with respect to scientific testimony, Baumeister and
Capone select their sources to claim, in contradiction to the above
assertion, that “[t]here is simply ‘no evidence that juries are
incompetent to evaluate expert testimony’ or that if permitted to
review all expert evidence . . . that there is a greater potential for
167
unsupported, exorbitant damage verdicts.”
To be fair, Baumeister and Capone offer several concrete
suggestions to address the problem of juror confusion, including
better lawyer communication and better jury instructions, providing a
written synopsis to the jury, back-to-back expert testimony (to allow
comparisons between conflicting experts), and allowing juror
questions. These suggestions, nevertheless, are lost in a polemic
against the “chilling” and “erosive” effect of judicial gatekeeping on
163

Mansfield, supra note 7, at 86 (citing Allen, supra note 12, at 7).
See supra notes 112-13, 121 and accompanying text.
165
Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1040.
166
See generally Sanders, supra note 21.
167
Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1041 (quoting Neil Vidmar & Shari
Seidman Diamond, The Jury in the Twenty-First Century: An Interdisciplinary Conference
Article: Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1175 (2001)).
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168

the adversary system.
“[Daubert has] effectively weakened the
parties’ control over litigation . . . and eliminated the trial judge’s
‘neutrality’ by empowering them [sic] to exclude critical evidence
169
from the jury’s consideration . . . .” Baumeister and Capone suspect
that the current restrictive regime, which is not in their view justified
by the texts of the trilogy, has more to do with judicial desire to
reduce case dockets and “an attempt by large corporations to deflect
170
some of society’s more difficult issues.”
In a similar but more sophisticated argument that plaintiffs in
civil suits are treated unfairly, Professor Cohen suggests that the
171
trilogy’s reliability standard is too high. Since a scientist’s “burden
of proof” for causation within the scientific community is higher than
“preponderance of the evidence,” Cohen contends, it is
172
inappropriate in a civil trial.
Though he proceeds by focusing on
epidemiology, Cohen makes clear that his argument applies to any
173
Unfortunately,
science that uses similar statistical reasoning.
Cohen’s argument oversimplifies the complexities of legal judgments;
as a result, he ends up idealizing the burden of proof and proposing
an impractical framework for civil trials.
To be concrete, Cohen’s argument can be restated by supposing
that one wants to know whether eating broccoli causes cancer.
(President Bush the Elder had different reasons for not wanting to
eat it, but suppose he had asked the National Institutes of Health to
investigate the question.) A scientist would first assume that broccoli
does not cause cancer. This assumption is the so-called “null
174
hypothesis.”
At this point, there is no deviation from the legal
system, which also starts with the assumption that a civil defendant
will not owe the plaintiff any money until the plaintiff comes forward
with proof. Next, the scientist would investigate the incidence of
cancer among those who eat broccoli and those who do not. The
empirical data may well show that cancer is higher among broccoli
eaters than among those who shun it, but this difference could be the
result of chance—the random nature of many events. To rule out
168

See Baumeister & Capone, supra note 24, at 1042.
Id. at 1043.
170
Id. at 1044
171
See generally Cohen, supra note 16.
172
See id. at 949 (“Science, particularly empirical science that relies on statistical
or other probabilistic methods, routinely uses filters that prevent its experts from
reaching exactly the sort of opinions as to the truth of ultimate facts that should be
utilized in a civil trial governed by the preponderance of the evidence rule.”).
173
See id. at 951-55.
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See id. at 952.
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chance, epidemiologists set a high standard; typically, the odds must
be better than twenty to one in favor of the broccoli–cancer link
175
before they will assume that the null hypothesis has been disproved.
What should courts make of this twenty-to-one standard?
Neither Cohen nor we would say that epidemiologists are not doing
their job well—they know their business better than we do.
Convinced that the legal system cannot integrate scientific
procedures into the courtroom, Cohen would have scientists alter
176
their normal criteria when they testify in court.
Cohen has based
his proposal on an idealization of the clarity with which lawyers,
judges, and jurors understand the burden of proof. “More probable
than not” is given the standard law school translation of “greater than
fifty percent,” and that fifty percent is assumed to mean the same
thing that fifty percent means in statistics. Not only does this move
radically oversimplify the process of analysis that ordinary people use
177
when they decide something has been proven, but it leads Cohen to
suggest that the scientific expert should testify as a non-scientist. To
illustrate, Cohen’s model for expert testimony includes the following:
I would not proclaim in an academic paper the existence of a link
between the medication and high blood pressure because the
[probability that data will suggest a link even when there is none]
is greater than 5%[;] . . . rather, I would write that the link is
suggested by the data but does [not] meet stringent scientific
standards designed to minimize . . . proclamation of inaccurate
findings . . . . But you have not asked me to present an academic
paper . . . . In this setting, I would set the threshold somewhat
lower, which I believe more accurately reflects the balance of
178
considerations in this setting.

The entire script of the model testimony—over 500 words—is
difficult to follow. In fact, the script could even be utilized to settle
the empirical debate over juror confusion in favor of jury critics; that
is, Cohen seems to join those who idealize the jury. More
importantly, it makes little sense to use scientists as courtroom
175

See id. (“[E]pidemiologist[s] . . . will typically not place weight on observed
results that are not significant at the 5% . . . level.”).
176
See id. at 961-62.
177
The research concerning jurors’ understanding of burdens of proof is
inconclusive. It suggests, however, that the preponderance of evidence burden of
proof is not understood the way that law professors often suggest; that is, a fifty-one
percent likelihood. See generally Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social
Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 589
(Dec. 1997); Rita James Simon & Linda Mahin, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View
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178
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“expert” legal theorists who proclaim reliability standards that are not
based on scientific methodology.
Joe Cecil is more generous in his response to Cohen, crediting
Cohen with “demonstrat[ing] that the conservative values implicit in
declaring the existence of an [epidemiological] effect place an
awesome barrier in the path of the plaintiff who wishes to present
179
expert evidence to the jury.” On the other hand, Cecil believes the
problem of reliability standards is more complicated than Cohen
realizes, since sciences other than epidemiology “endorse other value
systems . . . requir[ing] judges to resolve issues that the sciences
180
themselves have left unresolved.”
Indeed, referencing Cohen’s
alertness to the danger of scientific values overriding legal values,
Cecil begins his own analysis of scientific expertise by stating:
If only it were so easy. The problem is that there is not just one
science and not one scientific method. . . . [T]he values of
science vary across the individual disciplines. Each one has its
own norms and standards that vary greatly in the rigor they
181
impose in declaring a finding to be “scientific knowledge.”

Then, just as the reader is convinced that Cecil will not oversimplify
the problem of reliability, he changes the question.
Cecil
recommends that judges focus on sufficiency rather than reliability:
The courts cannot resolve the diverse views and values that
characterize the scientific academy; one science’s accepted
methodology may be another’s ipse dixit. A court can, however,
specify a minimum threshold [of sufficiency] for admissible
scientific evidence, and make clear that in doing so it is
establishing a legal standard and not assessing the ephemeral
182
concept of “scientific validity.”

Given his use of the word “sufficiency,” Cecil seems to suggest
that the best solution to the problems generated by the trilogy may be
to stop worrying about reliability and focus instead on whether
183
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict.
Or, perhaps Cecil is
suggesting a special use of the term “sufficiency” to denote a legal
179

Cecil, supra note 43, at 968.
Id. at 969.
181
Id. at 968 (responding to Cohen, and also to Sanders, supra note 21, who
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Id. at 985-86.
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Courts might, for example, treat the admissibility decision as a sufficiency decision
on the merits . . . .”).
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standard for admissibility of expertise that is different from scientific
reliability. In either event, we fail to understand why anyone would
believe that the problem of sufficiency is more tractable than
“reliability.”
The assumption seems to be that judges can
unproblematically handle such legal questions—an apparent
idealization of trial judges. Cecil, however, has simply re-labeled the
very same problem: Will not a judge deciding sufficiency have to
decide whether the scientific evidence is reliable? Indeed, if we all
agreed with Cecil that courts should specify minimum admissibility
184
thresholds, every debate in the field of post-trilogy discourse would
continue to flourish.
Cecil’s analysis provides another answer to the question of how
to ensure that only reliable evidence is admitted: to place more
responsibility on the trial judge. Professor Faigman’s similar view is,
perhaps, remarkable for its idealization of the trial judge’s role. With
respect to those scholars who tend to idealize the jury and seek “to
retain a prominent role for jurors in the evaluation of scientific
185
evidence,” Faigman is dismissive:
The issue of judge versus jury . . . is largely irrelevant. It is the
judge’s task to evaluate the validity of proffered expert testimony,
and that is all there is to it. . . . The only question is what is the
nature of the judge’s job in this regard—the rest will be done by
186
the jury.

According to Faigman, moreover, trial judges should not simply
attend to what happens to expertise in court, but also “to what
occurred before the expertise reached the courtroom and . . . what
187
might happen to the expertise subsequently.” While we agree that
188
an “admissibility decision necessarily requires a policy judgment,”
insofar as the scientific community does not provide answers to legal
questions, Faigman believes “that the evidentiary determination
regarding expert evidence must . . . integrate into its foundational
189
premises [ ] the culture of the scientific method.” Since we reject
any notion of “legal” science disengaged from actual scientific
practices, even that sounds agreeable. But for Faigman’s trial judge,
it is a two-way street. Judges should not only “ask whether better
evidence is available, [but] whether better evidence should be
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available.” If handwriting experts lack data, “[t]he issue is whether
the courts should expect the scientific community (broadly defined)
191
to have produced better data on handwriting.”
Faigman’s trial
judges, therefore, have the responsibility of “consider[ing] the
ramifications of their admissibility decisions both in regard to the
development of the respective expertise and in terms of the costs of
192
Anticipating criticism of this tall
errors . . . for society at-large.”
order, Faigman concedes that “many will complain about the
difficulty of the task. It is true that [this] complicates the judge’s job.
193
But so be it. Science is complicated.”
Faigman’s analysis is directed against Professor Nance, who is
particularly attentive to the limited “institutional capacities” of the
194
judge and jury.
Nance posits that problems generated by the
Daubert trilogy are best approached by “disavow[ing] a binary, all-ornothing concept of reliability”—or sufficiency, testability, or validity—
195
”in favor of a gradational concept.” We agree that the “fundamental
problem” for the doctrines concerning scientific expertise “is how to
map from a gradational epistemic conception of reliability to a dichotomous
196
legal choice on admissibility.”
The key to Nance’s aphorism and to
understanding the complexity of expertise in the courtroom is the
distinction between legal concepts and legal choices. Fundamental
legal concepts of evidence are indeed gradational. For example,
relevance under Rule 401, or an issue such as “motive,” is not easily
sorted into a “Yes or No” dichotomy. Sometimes the category is
clearly a “Yes,” sometimes clearly a “No,” and often times is
somewhere in between. Given that the law is forced to make morally,
legally, or politically painful dichotomous choices, we are tempted to
imagine that the concepts guiding our choices draw sharper
distinctions than they do. In that light, we happily endorse Nance’s
general thesis, which may lightheartedly be hyperbolized as the First
Commandment of evidence scholarship: Thou shalt not dichotomize,
except from necessity. And so, Nance argues:
(i) that the reliability determination, necessitated by current
jurisprudence but necessarily gradational, involves more than,
and therefore cannot be stabilized by, the requirements of
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197

relevance or expert qualifications;

(ii) that “sufficient reliability,” “testing,” “peer review and
publication,” and “low error rates” are as gradational as
198
“reliability,” and therefore provide it no stability;
(iii) that deference to scientific validity, itself a gradational
concept, provides no stability (and there is no good reason to
199
defer even if it did); and
(iv) that almost all imaginable dichotomies developed as proxies
for reliability without deference to science seem to be incompatible
200
“with established doctrine and institutional capacities.”

Nonetheless, “there is a germ of insight in such substitute
approaches”—namely, Nance’s idea that we should “think in terms of
201
comparative evaluation of . . . reliability.” For Nance, this leads to a
“better evidence” requirement—the appropriate basis for exclusion is
202
that better evidence is available.
In the opening pages of Nance’s study on the concept of
reliability, he engages in some interesting “boundary work” by
indicating his position on some of the debates in post-trilogy
scholarship. First, Nance states that “concerns about jury misuse of
expertise are less important than concerns about controlling
203
advocates . . . .”
Thus, in the debate over juror shortcomings,
Nance sides with those who subtly idealize the jury (and subtly blame
lawyers and experts who need controlling). This position is often
204
accompanied by a critique of the Rule 702 reliability requirement as
205
perhaps too restrictive.
Nance’s entire purpose, however, is to
provide “a workable interpretation of the reliability requirement in
206
Rule 702.” Second, in passing, Nance mentions that “greater use of
court-appointed experts [ ] may well be more important to the
207
administration of justice” than his own interpretive argument. His
statement betrays not only humility, but also a subtle idealization of
197

See id. at 195.
See id. at 197-200.
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Id. at 240-43.
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Id. at 193.
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See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 7, at 80 (arguing that Rule 702 of Federal Rules
of Evidence need not be read as requiring “reliability,” though many tend to adopt
that interpretation).
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See Cohen, supra note 16, at 963.
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science as relatively objective if you can just get it out of the hands of
advocates. Such a move is often accompanied by distrust of the jury.
In Nance’s case, however, his romantic image of the jury is
counterbalanced by his romantic image of science. He is able
rhetorically to proceed as if he is between the extremes of post-trilogy
scholarship. Indeed, Nance subsequently takes the position that legal
norms of reliability need not correspond to scientific norms of
208
reliability.
This approach is typical of those who idealize law as
capable of setting its own reliability standards. But when he contends
that “[s]cientific validity, as understood by scientists, should not be
209
considered necessary in all cases for adjudicative helpfulness,”
Nance is not adopting a modest view of science. Instead, Nance
210
glamorizes the notion of “scientifically well-grounded conclusions”
as perhaps too high a goal for, and therefore irrelevant with respect
to, the courtroom. In this Article, we have attempted to avoid
idealization of law or science, focusing on application. In sharp
contrast, Nance idealizes law and science. He worries that the focus
on the “task at hand” would, if “pressed to its logical conclusion . . .
make determinations of reliability all but impossible, for the
211
particular task at hand in a lawsuit is never replicated in research.”
Still, there is much in Nance’s study which we admire. He (i)
212
rejects the notion of a “threshold of reliability” as a blind alley; (ii)
acknowledges the “disagreement among scientists and philosophers
213
of science regarding the norms of scientific disciplines”; and (iii)
recognizes that in the absence of a universal standard of validity, the
scientific “community has developed dichotomous rules of thumb
that, while over- and under-inclusive in some cases, roughly serve to
214
further” the interests of science.
Thus, Nance reaches an
appropriately modest assessment of the scientific enterprise. As to his
analysis of the courts’ capacity to discern reliability, Nance offers
some modest recommendations that follow from his “gradational”
thesis. Few would find his proposals controversial. For example,
Nance states that “[c]urrent practice is often overly generous to
proponents in allowing opinions on case-specific material facts,
ultimate or not, when those facts are not within the personal
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215

knowledge of the expert.”
In other words, Nance advocates more
rigorous enforcement of the traditional rule that confined an
expert’s opinion to the scope of his or her expertise (for example, an
216
internist may not have expertise in oncology). We think that such
traditional principles enhance the focus on application.
Nance also condenses another version of the “scope of
expertise” principle, explaining: “Many claims to science are really
217
assertions of policy wrapped in the guise of science.”
Nance, like
218
Professor Faigman, from whom Nance borrowed this language,
identifies a difficult and non-obvious aspect of the “scope” principle.
Traditionally, this aspect took the form of a prohibition against
experts instructing the jury on matters of law. To illustrate, when an
expert opines that Practice X is safe while Practice Y is not, there is
always a danger that the expert is confusing the normative with the
219
statistical. The temptation to permit experts to go beyond science
and to broach matters of policy is powerful, and Nance’s advice is
consistent with the views of those scholars who focus on degrees of
confidence by experts.
Alternatively, consider Professor Imwinkelried’s criticism of
Nance’s version of the ancient “best evidence rule”: Proffered
expertise should be evaluated in comparison with alternative
expertise, and excluded only when more reliable expertise is
220
reasonably available to the proponent and not to the opponent.
Imwinkelried agrees that the “reliability-is-relative” (or “gradational”)
principle works with respect to the validity of an expert’s specified
theory or technique, the particular use of the expertise by a lawyer,
221
and the definiteness or degree of certitude of the expert’s opinion.
Nevertheless, Imwinkelried observes that when Nance attempts to
extend his thesis by invoking a best evidence rule, he begins to

215

Id. at 242-43.
In response, Professor Imwinkelried endorses this part of Nance’s argument,
albeit in different terms. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of Reliability, 34
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Nance, supra note 43, at 245 (quoting DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE
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220
See Imwinkelried, supra note 216, at 279 (citing Nance, supra note 43, at 237).
221
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222

The proposal multiplies the number of foundational issues . . .
before [the] final ruling . . . . The judge must decide: (1)
whether the proponent’s evidence is “reliable”; (2) whether other
expert techniques address the same question; (3) whether those
techniques are better . . . ; (4) whether a better technique is
reasonably available to the proponent [and] (5) . . . to the
opponent; and (6) whether the proponent is a repeat player. The
administration of this rule during a jury trial will necessitate
either horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged
223
recesses.

As we agree with Imwinkelried that Nance takes his relativity
principle too far, we obviously disagree with Faigman that Nance does
224
not go far enough. Faigman, even more than Nance, idealizes the
competence of judges well beyond what is reasonable to expect.
Faigman would have the trial judge participate in the culture of
science, and consider the effect that judicial decisions have on
225
creating incentives for developing better science. Indeed, Faigman
correctly argues that judicial decisions will offer incentives to out-of226
court players in the game of science.
Nevertheless, it does not
follow that judges should attempt to construct decisions that
maximize the social utility of science.
As our review of post-trilogy discourse demonstrates, the
idealizations of particular aspects of law—of appellate panels, of
juries, and of trial judges—has resulted in impractical proposals.
Sometimes, as with Professor Mansfield, idealization of the jury
interferes with the ability to appreciate Kumho Tire’s emphasis on the
“case at hand.” For Mansfield, any reliability standard, even one that
realistically acknowledges the pragmatic character of the scientific
enterprise and the diversity of methodologies, poses a threat to the
227
jury’s role.
With respect to the other scholars discussed in this

222

See id. at 283 (arguing that Nance’s proposal “would . . . render Rule 702
unworkable . . . .”).
223
Id. at 283-84.
224
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far been done, then, and often only then, will that work be done.”).
227
See generally Mansfield, supra note 7.

2004

EXPERT TESTIMONY

43

Article, idealization of appellate review or the trial judge also deflects
attention away from the application phase, because the difficult
problem of evaluating science is evaded by imagining an arbiter
above the fray. In our view, the application phase includes fallible,
but typically competent, lawyers and their experts, trial judges, juries,
and appellate judges, each of whom has a corrective role to play.
Neither demonizing nor idealizing any one of them is necessary (nor
helpful), and avoiding such tendencies keeps the focus on the
production of evidence for the case at hand.
V. CONCLUSION
[T]hree points come [through] clearly from Kumho Tire: First, a
court must review the reliability of the proffered expertise
specifically as it applies to the task for which it is being utilized in
the litigation in which it is offered, not in some more global
sense.
Second, a court is obliged to . . . select the most
appropriate criteria of reliability for the kind of expertise being
proffered, given the circumstances of its generation in the
particular case. . . . Third, . . . the presence or absence of one or
more [of the Daubert factors] is not necessarily dispositive of
228
sufficient reliability to gain admission.

Possibly because of the danger that the law may ignore “global”
reliability, some evidence scholars resist the current focus on the
“task at hand”; recall Professor Allen’s concern, echoed by Professor
229
Moreno, that “without global reliability, one has gibberish.”
Even
230
among scientists, however, “reliability” is an ephemeral concept
231
and, in both global and local contexts, a question of degree.
Accordingly, the task of establishing global reliability in a particular
case is impractical. Global reliability is no guarantee that a particular
232
application by an expert is reliable. Even when a “global warrant” is
unavailable, a particular application, if accompanied by an
233
appropriate “level of confidence,” can assist a jury.
Reliability, nevertheless, is not so vague as to be useless. We
reject both the idealization of science (or scientific methodology) as
a source of uncontroversial knowledge (or standards), as well as
228
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idealizations of law that seem to render scientific standards
superfluous. Between those poles lies a balanced respect for both law
and science that allows simultaneous acknowledgement of their
practical goals and limitations. In many important respects, science
differs from law. Law may govern and regulate a field of science, but
does much more. Likewise, science does more than produce useful
knowledge for law. Nonetheless, both fields share the characteristics
of a social institution: both are communities with (albeit distinct)
conventions, consensus-building techniques, rhetorical strategies,
gatekeeping procedures, and internal debates. When an expert is
judged as to whether his or her application is reliable, an immodest
view of science may lead to an unjustified restrictiveness. In contrast,
those who possess modest views of science are not surprised by
degrees of reliability, uncertainty, scientific conflict, alternative
explanations, mere probabilities, incomplete data, or the funding of
234
research.
The other extreme, however, is just as impractical—
namely, the expectation that appellate review, scientifically astute or
policy-making trial judges, or juries can function to solve or evade the
problem of discerning reliable expertise. Though we share the
confidence that appellate judges can correct abuses of discretion by
means of evidentiary rulings, we have no illusions that, as a group,
they possess the time and resources to serve as an anchor for disputes
over reliability, such that de novo review should be the norm.
Likewise, we support efforts to educate judges. In addition to
scientific methodology, however, pragmatic social, institutional, and
235
rhetorical aspects of science must also be understood. Some argue
that judges should make “science policy” and set their own standards
for sufficiency apart from science. Admissibility standards are legal,
not scientific, constructions; yet, this is not without risks. If scientific
expertise (even modestly conceived) is disengaged from law, the
courtroom might be saddled with an unscientific (and therefore
unreliable) “legal science.”
Finally, with respect to those who question reliability standards
by way of idealizing the jury’s role, we are concerned, like Professor
Sanders, about jurors’ capacities to understand complex scientific
evidence, even though the research on that problem is not
236
conclusive. While Professors Mansfield and Nance reject the notion
237
that jurors are unsophisticated,
we consider this debate as
234
235
236
237
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significant. Unlike Professor Faigman, we cannot casually disregard
238
it. This Article does not attempt to idealize jurors, trial judges, or
even appellate judges. No single structure of the legal system
provides a “panic room” where one can escape the problems of
reliable applications.
Recognizing the practical limitations of both science and law
helps scholars to avoid impractical proposals for reform. Typically,
since the pragmatic aspects of science are demonized, idealizations of
science result in proposals for an overly restrictive regime.
Idealizations of law likewise generally produce proposals with
impractical features. Romantic images of appellate courts fail to
recognize their limited resources. Romantic images of trial judges
overestimate their capacity to criticize expertise and make “science
policy” decisions. And romantic images of the jury disengage science
from law. Moreover, proposals to raise the admissibility standards for
forensic scientists, or lower them for civil trial plaintiffs, if successful,
could engender other changes to the legal system. To illustrate, if
courts agree to go easier on plaintiffs’ experts, tort reform advocates
might gain the upper hand. As Professor Lillquist humorously, and
shrewdly, suggests, if
Judge Pollak had stuck to his decision in United States v. Llera
Plaza, limiting the testimony of the government’s fingerprint
examiners and forbidding them from opining that a particular
print is from a particular person . . . it seems to me at least
possible, if not likely, that Congress would have quickly passed
legislation entitled something like the Latent Fingerprint
239
Admissibility Act of 2002.

For our purposes, changes in one area of the law can generate a
backlash. Therefore, solutions must take into account the practical
context. In the area of admissibility of scientific expertise, for
example, arguments for restrictiveness that rest on idealizations of
science are met with arguments that idealize the jury in order to
overcome those restrictions. So long as one modestly views both
science and law as pragmatic enterprises, the trilogy’s focus on
application can work in its present form without raising or lowering
reliability standards, and without changing the abuse-of-discretion
standard or the current roles of judges as gatekeepers and jurors as
beneficiaries (or victims) of a gatekeeping regime.
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